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Abstract 10 
Recent evidence suggests that infants as young as 12 month of age use pointing to 11 
communicate about absent entities. The tacit assumption underlying these studies is that infants 12 
do so based on tracking what their interlocutor experienced in a previous shared interaction. 13 
The present study addresses this assumption empirically. In three experiments, 12-month-old 14 
infants could request additional desired objects by pointing to the location in which these 15 
objects were previously located. We systematically varied whether the adult from whom infants 16 
were requesting had previously experienced the former content of the location with the infant. 17 
Infants systematically adjusted their pointing to the now empty location to what they 18 
experienced with the adult previously. These results suggest that infants’ ability to 19 
communicate about absent referents is based on an incipient form of common ground. 20 
Keywords: Communication, displacement, common ground, pointing, social cognition  21 
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1. Introduction 22 
Language is inherently ambiguous. When interpreting others' utterances, it is not 23 
sufficient to focus on what is said, but one also needs to consider the context in which something 24 
is said. A crucial aspect of context is the common ground shared between speaker and listener 25 
(Bohn & Köymen, 2017; H. H. Clark, 1996; Sperber, 2001; Tomasello, 2008). Part of the 26 
common ground between two individuals is what they mutually know about a certain state of 27 
affairs. As an example for how common ground can be used to disambiguate utterances 28 
consider the following: A speaker may communicate to a listener that she desires another piece 29 
of cake by pointing to an empty plate if it is part of common ground that this plate previously 30 
contained pieces of cake. For a person not sharing this common ground, the point to the empty 31 
plate would fail to denote the absent cake. To use common ground, speakers and listeners 32 
therefore have to keep track of what they experience with whom. Utterances produced and 33 
interpreted in light of common ground quickly lose their ambiguity. 34 
Common ground is not only vital for adult communication, but arguably even more so 35 
for young children in the process of learning language. This is for at least two reasons: On the 36 
one hand, children's earliest forms of intentional communication (e.g. pointing gestures or one-37 
word utterances) are considerably more ambiguous compared to fully formed adult speech. 38 
Successful communication based on these signals heavily relies on common ground. By 39 
considering whether something is part of common ground, children can actively help their 40 
partner figure out what they mean. On the other hand, when on the receiving end, children are 41 
faced with more ambiguity compared to an adult listener because oftentimes they do not know 42 
the conventional meaning of words. Again, considering common ground when interpreting 43 
utterances greatly facilitates disambiguation and learning. For example, when engaged with 44 
someone in naming things by their color, the novel word "zeleny" most likely refers to yet 45 
another object's color instead of e.g. its name. In this spirit, a number of theoretical accounts 46 
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have emphasized the importance of common ground for early communication and language 47 
acquisition (Bohn & Köymen, 2017; Bruner, 1974; E. V. Clark, 2015; Tomasello, 2008; 48 
Tomasello, Carpenter, & Liszkowski, 2007). 49 
From a psychological perspective, common ground is traditionally conceptualized as 50 
involving recursive mindreading on both ends: Speaker and listener reason about each other’s 51 
mental states to determine what is part of common ground and what not. If recursive 52 
mindreading was a pre-requisite for using common ground, it would be unlikely that infants are 53 
able to do so because these abilities do not emerge until around six years of age (Miller, 2009). 54 
Recently, Bohn and Köymen (2017) proposed a developmental perspective on common ground, 55 
arguing that recursive mindreading might be an outcome of communication based on common 56 
ground rather than a prerequisite. The developmental primitive of common ground is the 57 
expectation that others act rationally in light of shared experience. While preserving the idea of 58 
ambiguity reduction, this view does not put recursive mindreading at the core of common 59 
ground. When reviewing the literature and discussing our results, we do so in light of this 60 
perspective.  61 
There is a solid body of empirical evidence supporting the claim that even very young 62 
children (below age 2) rely on common ground when interpreting ambiguous utterances. 63 
Tomasello and Haberl (2003) showed that 12- and 18-month-old children consider what is new 64 
to a speaker (i.e. what is not part of common ground) when interpreting ambiguous requests 65 
(see also Moll & Tomasello, 2007; Moll, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2007). In a study by Ganea 66 
and Saylor (2007), 15- and 18-month-olds interpreted an ambiguous request ("Can you get it 67 
for me?") as referring to an object that was part of a previous interaction (see also Saylor & 68 
Ganea, 2007; Saylor, Ganea, & Vázquez, 2011). Liebal, Behne, Carpenter, and Tomasello 69 
(2009) had infants play different games with two experimenters. Later, 18-month-olds (and to 70 
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some extend also 14-month-olds) interpreted and ambiguous point to an object by one of the 71 
experimenters as referring to the game they previously played with that particular individual. 72 
There is considerably less evidence that young children adjust their own communicative 73 
acts to common ground. In a study by Liebal, Carpenter, and Tomasello (2010), participants 74 
played with different toys with two different experimenters. When later confronted with a 75 
photograph of these toys, 18-month-old infants pointed more often to the toy they previously 76 
shared with the experimenter that was now with them. In this study, 14-month-olds did not 77 
show a consistent pattern of pointing. More recently, a number of studies claimed that already 78 
12-month-olds rely on common ground when communicating about absent entities (Bohn, Call, 79 
& Tomasello, 2015; Liszkowski, Schäfer, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2009).  80 
Studies looking at children's comprehension of words referring to absent entities find first 81 
signs of comprehension at around 12 months of age (Ganea & Saylor, 2013; Osina, Saylor, & 82 
Ganea, 2013, 2014; Saylor, 2004) and fairly solid comprehension abilities in place around 16 83 
months (Osina, Saylor, & Ganea, 2017). On the other hand, children do not produce their first 84 
words referring to absent entities until around 18 months (Veneziano & Sinclair, 1995). The 85 
studies reporting early use of common ground therefore looked at children’s pointing behavior. 86 
When pointing, reference to the absent entity is not grounded in the conventional semantics of 87 
words but in shared experience. In the corresponding studies, children pointed to the previous 88 
location of an object in order to request another one of that kind (Bohn et al., 2015; Liszkowski 89 
et al., 2009; see also Liszkowski, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2007). Presumably, infants did so in 90 
appreciation of the shared inter- action with their interlocutor around this location while it still 91 
contained objects. However, this assumption and with it the role of common ground was not 92 
addressed empirically. 93 
The present study aimed at filling this gap by investigating whether 12-month-old infants 94 
adjust their communicative acts to previous interactions with an interlocutor. In particular, we 95 
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focused on whether they take into account what their interlocutor experienced in an earlier 96 
interaction. To this end, we adopted the methodology developed by Bohn et al. (2015). 97 
Participants played a game in which they requested visible objects, placed on two plates, from 98 
an experimenter in order to throw them into a container. Following Bohn et al. (2015), we 99 
manipulated the content of the two plates. The plates either contained objects of the same 100 
quality (both high or both low quality) or of a different quality (one high quality and the other 101 
low quality). Importantly, the low quality objects were nevertheless desirable to infants when 102 
presented on their own. During the warm-up phase, whenever one option was depleted, the 103 
experimenter (E1) left the room and brought new objects of that kind. In the test phase, after 104 
the participant had again requested all objects from one of the plates, E1 left the room 105 
again. In this situation, one plate was empty and the other still contained visible objects. 106 
Bohn et al. (2015) argued and presented evidence that a desirable and visible alternative is 107 
necessary to interpret infants’ requests as intended to obtain a specific object. Furthermore, 108 
without a desirable alternative option, participants might simply point to the empty plate 109 
because no other way to continue the game in general is available. This would make it difficult 110 
to investigate whether infants take into account previous interactions with the respective 111 
experimenter. However, presenting a valuable alternative option decreases the number of points 112 
to the empty plate in the test phase. The focus of the study was therefore not whether infants at 113 
12 month of age request absent objects more often than visible objects but how requests for 114 
absent objects were distributed across conditions. 115 
We then manipulated who would return to the test room. In the case that E1 returned to 116 
the test room, E1 had previously seen the former content of the plate. If E2 returned to the test 117 
room, she had not seen it. During the test phase, we coded whether infants would point to the 118 
empty plate to request additional objects. For E1, who previously saw the former content of the 119 
plate, we expected infants to point to the empty plate only if its previous content was of a higher 120 
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quality com- pared to the visible option (specific requests). For E2, who never saw the former 121 
content of the empty plate, we expected infants to ignore the previous content of the empty 122 
plate. In a second experiment, we specified which aspects of the previous interaction drives 123 
infants' pointing. A third experiment replicated experiment 2. 124 
2. Experiment 1 125 
2.1. Participants 126 
We tested 64 twelve-month-old infants (M = 382.9 days, SD = 7.0 days, 32 girls). 127 
Participants came from mixed socioeconomic backgrounds, lived in a middle-sized German 128 
city and were recruited from a database of children whose parents volunteered for studies on 129 
child development. Parents were asked prior to the study whether their child already pointed 130 
and only infants who pointed were included in the study. Additional infants were invited but 131 
had to be excluded because they completed only one experimental session (12) lost interest or 132 
became uncomfortable in the first experimental session (nine), their parents interfered (one) or 133 
the experimenter made a mistake (one). 134 
2.2. Setup 135 
Infants were tested in a separate room within a child laboratory. They were seated on their 136 
parents lap facing the experimenter’s chair (distance: 140 cm), flanked by two platforms (55 x 137 
28 x 69 cm; distance between platforms 50 cm) with a ceramic plate (Ø 20 cm) on top. In front 138 
of the infant stood a cylindrical container (Ø 24 cm, height 47 cm) with a funnel on top (see 139 
Figure 1). The container was close enough to the infant to insert objects into the funnel. 140 
Inserting an object produced a rattling sound and made the object disappear. The two platforms 141 
were located closer to the experimenter so that she could easily reach for the objects placed on 142 
the plates while the objects were out of reach for the infant. The objects used throughout the 143 
study were colorful balls (red and blue, Ø 5 cm) as well as wooden cubes (side length 2.5 cm). 144 
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Pilot testing showed that infants generally preferred the balls to the blocks, although the blocks 145 
were nevertheless desirable when presented on their own. Additional objects were stored 146 
outside the test room and were never visible to the infant. 147 
 148 
149 
Figure 1. Schematic overview of the setup and procedure in experiment 1. Constellations varied 150 
depending on whether the experimenter who was present during test, previously saw the content 151 
of the empty plate [see (+/-)]. They further varied depending on the previous content of the 152 
empty plate at test (same or different from the visible alternative). In a second variation of the 153 
same condition (not depicted here), there were balls on both plates. 154 
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2.3. Procedure 155 
For a schematic overview of the procedure see Figure 1. Infants and their parents arrived 156 
in a playroom within the laboratory where they met the experimenters E1 and E2. Together they 157 
played until the infant was comfortable with the situation. Within the test room, the interaction 158 
between the infant and the experimenter was structured as a game in which the experimenter 159 
would hand over requested objects to the infant who could insert them into the container. Infants 160 
requested objects placed on the plates one by one by pointing to them. In the beginning of each 161 
session, both plates were covered by a grey cardboard box. Throughout the experiment, the 162 
experimenter never labeled the objects. Each session had a warm-up and a test phase. 163 
2.3.1. Warm-up 164 
E1 led the infant together with the parent to the test room. After sitting down, E1 removed 165 
the cardboard boxes from the plates simultaneously. Each plate contained two objects of the 166 
same kind (either two balls or two blocks). Depending on the condition of the factor content the 167 
two plates contained either the same kind of objects (same condition, both plates balls or both 168 
plates blocks) or different objects (different condition, one plate balls the other blocks). In the 169 
beginning, E1 took one object from the right plate, showed it to the infant and threw it into the 170 
container. E1 then repeated the same procedure with an object from the left plate. Next, E1 took 171 
an object from the right plate, handed it over to the infant and encouraged him or her to throw 172 
it into the container. Again the same procedure was repeated with an object from the left plate. 173 
As soon as the infant had thrown the last object into the container, E1 stood up, left the room 174 
and returned with four additional objects. E1 placed them on the plates so that each plate 175 
contained the same kind of object as it did before. After re-baiting, E1 waited for the infant to 176 
request further objects by pointing. As soon as the infant had requested all objects from one 177 
plate, E1 stood up, left the room and re-baited the two plates in the same way as before. Then, 178 
E1 waited for the infant to request more objects. As soon as the infant had requested all objects 179 
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from one of the plates for the second time, E1 again stood up and left the room. Next, one of 180 
the experimenters entered the room and the test phase began. However, this time the 181 
experimenter who entered the room did not re-bait the empty plate. Therefore, one plate still 182 
contained objects while the other one was empty. The warm-up phase served three purposes: 183 
(a) to familiarize infants with the general structure of the game, (b) to show that more objects 184 
are available, and (c) that E1 is willing and able to get them. 185 
2.3.2. Test 186 
The test phase followed immediately after the end of the warm-up phase. Depending on 187 
the condition of the factor see either E1 or E2 entered the room. In the see(+) condition, E1 188 
entered the room. In this case, E1 had seen the former content of the now empty plate. In the 189 
see (-) condition, E2 entered the room. In this case, E2 had not seen the former content of the 190 
now empty plate. After entering the test room, the experimenter sat down and waited for the 191 
infant to request additional objects. If the infant pointed to the empty plate, the experimenter 192 
left the room and brought another object of the kind that was previously on the empty plate. 193 
Then the test session ended. If the infant pointed the container, the experimenter ignored the 194 
point. If the infant pointed to the visible object, the experimenter handed over one of the objects 195 
and a second test trial began. The test session ended as soon as both plates were empty. The 196 
maximum number of test trials per participant and session was therefore two. For each test trial, 197 
if infants did not point spontaneously, the experimenter issued a reminder every 15 s in which 198 
she alternated lifting the plates while calling the infant’s name. If the infant did not point for 60 199 
s, the test session ended. During test trials, the experimenter openly looked at the participant 200 
and specifically avoided looking at the plates when waiting for a request. Parents were unaware 201 
of the details of the study. They were told that the objective of the study was to investigate 202 
infants’ reactions to the interruption of a communicative interaction. Furthermore, they were 203 
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instructed to re- main passive and refrain from pointing or labeling the objects. Debriefing after 204 
the study showed that parents did not regard pointing to empty plates as the focus of the study. 205 
Crossing of the two factors content and see resulted in a two by two design with four 206 
different constellations (see Fig. 1). In the see(+) – different constellation, the two plates 207 
contained different objects and E1 was present during the test phase. The empty plate therefore 208 
previously contained the infant’s preferred kind of object and E1 knew about this. In the see(+) 209 
– same constellation, the two plates contained the same objects and E1 was present during the 210 
test phase. The empty plate therefore previously contained the same kind of object that was also 211 
visible on the other plate. Furthermore, E1 knew about this. In the see(-) – different 212 
constellation, the two plates contained different objects and E2 was present during the test 213 
phase. The empty plate therefore previously contained the infant’s preferred kind of object. 214 
However, E2 did not know about this. In the see(-) – same constellation, the two plates 215 
contained the same objects and E2 was present during the test phase. The empty plate therefore 216 
previously contained the same kind of object that was also visible on the other plate. 217 
Furthermore, E2 did not know about this. 218 
In order to have a complete within-subject design, each participant would have had to 219 
complete four test sessions. However, this would have resulted in a procedure that would have 220 
been too long for 12- month-old infants. Therefore, we resorted to a partial within-subject 221 
design and tested each infant in only two test sessions. In doing so, we varied both factors at 222 
the same time between test sessions for each infant. For example, infants who started with the 223 
see(+) – different constellation in the first session received the see(-) – same constellation in 224 
the second session. Infants starting with see(-) – different continued with see(+) – same and so 225 
on. This resulted in four different combinations of conditions. Infants were randomly assigned 226 
to one of these combinations with the same number of boys and girls in each combination. 227 
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2.4. Coding and analysis 228 
We coded whether infants pointed or not and whether they pointed to the empty plate. 229 
We defined pointing in the following way: the participant extended at least one arm (either fully 230 
or partially), with either the index finger or the whole hand stretched out, and briefly stayed in 231 
this position. We did not code as pointing if the participant pointed to two different locations 232 
simultaneously or pointed while E was away. The first author coded all sessions from video. A 233 
second coder, blind to the purpose of the study, coded 25% of all test sessions randomly selected 234 
for experiment 1 and 2 combined. There was a very high agreement of 98.6% between the two 235 
coders (𝜅 = .97). 236 
To analyse whether pointing to the empty plate was influenced by content and see we 237 
used generalized linear mixed models (GLMM) with a binomial error structure. We included 238 
content, see and their interaction as fixed within-subject factors and participant id as a random 239 
effect. Furthermore, we assessed whether age (in days) or sex had an effect. We used likelihood 240 
ratio tests (LRT) to obtain p-values by comparing the model fit of different models. Significant 241 
interactions were followed up with post-hoc general linear models (GLMs) within each see 242 
condition. All models were fitted in R (R Core Team, 2017) using the functions glmer and glm 243 
of the R-package lme4 (Bates, Mächler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015). The data and r-code 244 
associated with this article can be found in the supplementary material. 245 
2.5. Results 246 
All infants (100%) pointed during the warm-up phase and all but five infants (92.2%) 247 
pointed at least once during the test phase. In the test phase, we observed a total number of 181 248 
points. The majority of points were directed at the visible alternative (160) and only a smaller 249 
proportion at the empty plate (21). This distribution was expected and corresponds to that of 250 
earlier studies using the same general setup (Bohn et al., 2015). The focus of this study was 251 
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whether infants’ pointing for absent entities would follow a systematic pattern. In what follows, 252 
we therefore only analyzed the points that were directed at empty plates. Fig. 2 shows how the 253 
points to empty plates were distributed across the four constellations. 254 
A GLMM with content, see and their interaction as fixed effects fitted the data better 255 
compared to a model lacking them (LRT: 𝜒2 (3) = 8.73, p = .033). The inclusion of sex and age 256 
did not further improve the model fit and were therefore omitted for subsequent analysis (LRT: 257 
𝜒2 (2) = 4.22, p = .12). In the final model, we found a significant interaction between content 258 
and see (LRT: 𝜒2 (1) = 4.47, p = .034; 𝛽 = -3.36, 95% CI = [-9.16: -0.26]). The follow-up 259 
analysis within each see condition showed that infants pointed to the empty plate more often in 260 
the different than in the same condition in the see (+) condition (𝛽 = -2.33, p = .007; 95% CI = 261 
[-5.27: -0.57], d = - 0.44) but not in the see(-) condition (𝛽 = 0.31, p = .626; 95% CI = [- 0.92: 262 
1.61], d = 0.11). 263 
 264 
Figure 2. Proportion of infants pointing to the empty plate in each experiment. During test trials, 265 
one plate was empty. Objects on plates refers to the previous content of the plates, which was 266 
either of the same or of a different quality. See (+/-) denotes whether the experimenter present 267 
in the test trial had previously seen the content of the empty plate.  268 
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2.6. Discussion 269 
In this experiment, infants were faced with the choice of either requesting a visible object 270 
or requesting an absent object by pointing to its previous location. In the factor content, we 271 
varied whether the two locations contained the same or a different object. Pointing to the empty 272 
location only when it previously contained an object that is different from the visible object 273 
indicated a specific request. In the factor see, we further varied whether the person from whom 274 
infants were requesting had seen the former content of the now empty plate. The significant 275 
interaction between content and see indicated that infants treated the content of the plates 276 
differently depending on what the experimenter knew about them. The follow-up analysis 277 
showed that infants pointed more often to the empty plate in the different compared to the same 278 
condition (i.e. they made specific requests) only for E1 but not for E2. This shows that infants 279 
requested specific absent entities only from an experimenter who saw them in the same location 280 
in an earlier episode.  281 
Pointing to empty plates cannot be explained by low-level associative cues or simple 282 
heuristics. Infants had not been rewarded for pointing to the empty plate prior to the test trial 283 
and if pointing would have reflected simply repeating the same behavior as before, no 284 
difference between the conditions should have been found (see also Bohn et al., 2015, p. 70). 285 
There are, however, two major objections to be raised: First, the interaction between content 286 
and see was driven by the low rate of pointing in the see(+) – same constellation instead of a 287 
high rate of pointing in the see(+) – different constellation (see Figure 2). We expected that 288 
infants would treat the see(+) – same constellation similar to the two see(-) constellations and 289 
show a considerable higher rate of pointing only in the see(+) – different constellation. A 290 
potential explanation for this pattern is that infants’ overall rate of pointing to the empty plate 291 
was lower in the two see(+) constellations compared to the see(-) constellations. Why? During 292 
the warm-up, E1 left the room twice and returned with new objects. Prior to the test phase, E1 293 
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left the room, but this time E1 returned empty handed. This might have lowered infants’ 294 
expectation that additional objects are available and therefore lowered their requests of absent 295 
entities in general while still conserving the difference between the two content conditions. E2 296 
on the other hand had never brought objects before and E2’s empty-handed appearance bore no 297 
direct relation to the availability of additional objects. Second, it is unclear which aspect of the 298 
previous interaction affected pointing. E1 and E2 not only differed in what they saw in the 299 
previous interaction but also differed in what they demonstrated about their ability to provide 300 
additional objects. That is, it is unclear whether infants did not request specific objects from E2 301 
because E2 never saw the former content of the plate or because E2 never brought additional 302 
objects. Common ground in communication as outlined in the introduction requires tracking of 303 
shared experience. For the purpose of the current study it would therefore be important to show 304 
that infants take into account what their interlocutor saw during the earlier episode, not just 305 
what she is able to do. To address these concerns, we conducted a second experiment. 306 
3. Experiment 2 307 
In the second experiment, we changed the setup so that the place where E1 retrieved 308 
additional objects was different from the place where E1 disappeared (and re-appeared from) 309 
in the test phase. We separated a small portion of the test room with a large cupboard (see 310 
Figure 2). Furthermore, we changed the procedure, so that the experimenter from whom infants 311 
requested in the test phase had always provided them with additional objects before. This 312 
allowed us to vary the experimenter’s knowledge independently from her ability. Infants 313 
initially played the game in a separate warm-up session with E1. During this warm-up session, 314 
E1 repeatedly left the room to get additional objects. In the following test session, infants 315 
initially played the same game either with E1 or E2. This time, as soon as one plate was empty, 316 
the experimenter – either E1 or E2 – did not refill the plate but disappeared behind the cupboard. 317 
Shortly afterwards, always E1 returned from behind the cupboard. If E1 was also the one who 318 
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disappeared behind the cupboard, E1 had seen what was on the plate. If E2 was initially present, 319 
E1 had not seen the previous content of the plate. The central question was whether infants 320 
would point to the empty plate more often if E1 knew about its previous content. 321 
To shorten and streamline the procedure for each participant we dropped the partial within 322 
subject design and tested each infant only in a single test session with a single test trial. In 323 
experiment 1 as well as in a previous study (Bohn et al., 2015), only a single point to an empty 324 
plate occurred in the second test trial. Furthermore, because we expected E1’s knowledge to 325 
affect infants’ pointing only in the different condition we dropped the same condition. 326 
327 
Figure 3. Schematic overview of the setup and the procedure in experiment 2. Instead of leaving 328 
the room the experimenters dis- and reappeared from behind the cupboard depicted on the left 329 
of the experimenter. The factor see (+/-) varied depending on which experimenter was present 330 
in the beginning of the test session. 331 
3.1. Participants 332 
We tested a new group of 80 twelve-month-old infants (M=382.5 days, SD = 7.2 days, 333 
40 girls). Again, only infants who pointed were included in the study. For the second 334 
experiment, 13 additional infants were invited but had to be excluded because they lost interest 335 
or became uncomfortable (nine), their parents interfered (two) or the experimenter made a 336 
mistake (two). 337 
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3.2. Setup 338 
The setup and the materials were identical to experiment 1 except for the following 339 
changes: A small portion of the test room to the left of the experimenter’s chair was separated 340 
from the rest of the room by two large cupboards that completely occluded a person standing 341 
behind them from any other position within the room (Figure 3). Furthermore, the two plates 342 
always contained different objects. The location of the balls (left or right) was counterbalanced 343 
across participants 344 
3.3. Procedure 345 
For a schematic overview of the procedure see Figure 3. Infants and their parents arrived 346 
in a playroom within the laboratory where they met the experimenters E1 and E2. Infants were 347 
randomly assigned to one of the two experimental conditions with the same number of boys 348 
and girls in each condition. The experiment was split into two sessions, warm-up and test. The 349 
two sessions were separated by a short time in the playroom. The general structure of the game 350 
was the same as in experiment 1. 351 
3.3.1. Warm-up 352 
The warm-up session was the same as the warm-up phase in experiment 1. However, as 353 
soon as the infant requested all objects from one plate for the second time, the experimenter put 354 
the cardboard boxes back on the plates and the session ended. E1 then led the infant together 355 
with the parent back to the playroom. Again, this warm-up session served three purposes: a) to 356 
familiarize infants with the general structure of the game, b) to show that more objects are 357 
available, and c) that E1 is able to get them. 358 
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3.3.2. Test 359 
There were two different test conditions. In the see(+) condition, E1 led the infant and the 360 
parent back to the test room. Like in the warm-up session, one of the plates contained balls and 361 
the other contained blocks. E1 uncovered the plates and the infant was allowed to request his 362 
or her preferred objects. As soon as the infant emptied one of the plates, E1 stood up and 363 
disappeared behind the cupboards. After five seconds, E1 re-appeared from behind the 364 
cupboards and sat down on the experimenter’s chair. This marked the beginning of the single 365 
test trial. In the test trial, E1 had seen the content of the now empty plate. 366 
In the see(-) condition, E1 left the playroom earlier (during the play period between the 367 
warm-up and test session) and silently hid behind the cupboard in the test room. E2 led the 368 
infant and the parent back to the test room, sat down on the experimenter’s chair and uncovered 369 
the plates. The plates were baited in the same way as in the see(+) condition. Infants could 370 
request their preferred objects. As soon as the infant emptied one of the plates, E2 stood up and 371 
disappeared behind the cupboards. After five seconds, E1 re-appeared from behind the 372 
cupboards and sat down on the experimenter’s chair. In the test trial, E1 had therefore not seen 373 
the content of the now empty plate. During the test trial, the experimenter behaved in the same 374 
way as in experiment 1. Parents were again asked to remain passive and were not fully debriefed 375 
until after the study. Pointing to empty plates was not regarded as the focus of the study. 376 
3.4. Coding and analysis 377 
The general coding was the same as in experiment 1. For reliability see section 2.4. To 378 
analyse whether infants pointed differently in the two experimental conditions we used 379 
generalized linear models (GLM). The response variable was binary (point to absent or not); 380 
therefore we used a binomial error structure to fit the data. The models included see as fixed 381 
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between-subject effect. Furthermore, we assessed the effect of age and sex as fixed between 382 
subject factors. 383 
3.5. Results 384 
All infants (100%) pointed during the warm-up sessions and the majority of infants 385 
(82.5%) also pointed during the single test trial. Nineteen infants pointed to the empty plate. 386 
Figure 2 shows the proportion of infants pointing to the empty plate in each condition. We 387 
found that a GLM with see as predictor tended to fit the data better compared to the null model 388 
lacking this predictor (LRT: 𝜒2(1) = 3.45, p = .063). Infants tended to point more often to the 389 
empty plate in the see(+) condition compared to the see(-) condition (𝛽 = 1.00, p = .063; 95% 390 
CI = [-0.05: 2.16]; d = 0.41). The additional predictors sex and age did not improve the fit to 391 
the data and were therefore omitted (LRT: 𝜒2(2) = 1.84, p = .399). 392 
3.6. Discussion 393 
In experiment 2, we addressed several concerns that had been raised in the discussion of 394 
experiment 1. Like in experiment 1, we varied whether or not E had seen the former content of 395 
the empty plate. Importantly we did this while keeping E’s ability to provide additional objects 396 
constant. We found that infants tended to point to the empty plate more often when E1 had 397 
previously seen its former content. 398 
The design of experiment 2 rules out several additional alternative explanations. First of 399 
all, perceptual differences during test trials cannot explain the difference between the 400 
conditions. The test situation was identical in both conditions: infants were faced with two 401 
plates of which one contained a less preferred visible alternative while the other plate previously 402 
contained a preferred object. Furthermore, the experimenter from whom infants were requesting 403 
was identical. Second, forming an association between pointing to an empty plate in the 404 
presence of E1 and receiving an object was not possible because the single test trial was the 405 
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first instance in which infants had the chance to point to an empty plate. Third, it is unlikely 406 
that infants pointed less often to the empty plate in the see(-) condition because they were 407 
distracted or surprised by the appearance of a different person from behind the cupboard. This 408 
is unlikely because the person appearing (E1) was already familiar to them from the warm-up 409 
period (for infants ability to recognize individuals see Haan, Johnson, Maurer, & Perrett, 2001; 410 
Turati, Bulf, & Simion, 2008). Fourth, infants did not simply associate “pointing in the presence 411 
of E1” with “more desirable objects”. An association like this should not have led to differential 412 
outcomes between the conditions as infants requested desirable objects from E1 in the same 413 
way in the warm-up session. 414 
Even though experiment 2 provides suggestive evidence that infants tracked their shared 415 
experiences with the experimenter, this interpretation is compromised by the fact that the effect 416 
was small and only a trend from a statistical perspective. Presumably, a stronger effect was 417 
masked by the overall low rate of pointing to the empty plate. To test the robustness of the 418 
effect found in experiment 2, we conducted a third experiment. 419 
4. Experiment 3 420 
The low rate of pointing to the empty plate in experiment 2 might have been due to the 421 
relatively attractive alternative option and the fact that participants only received a single trial. 422 
Liszkowski et al. (2009) used an unattractive alternative option and administered two trials, 423 
yielding a substantially higher rate of pointing to the empty plate. To increase the rate of 424 
pointing in experiment 3, we replaced the desirable alternative option with an undesirable one 425 
and also administered a second trial. In contrast to experiment 1, in which additional test trials 426 
happened within the same session, in experiment 3, the two test trials were administered in two 427 
separate sessions. 428 
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We also addressed another procedural shortcoming of experiment 2. During warm-up and 429 
the beginning of the test trial, infants received two more objects from E1 in the see(+) condition 430 
because E2 was present in the beginning of the test trials of the see(-) condition. Differential 431 
pointing might therefore have been due to a stronger association between E1 and the desirable 432 
object in the see(+) condition. To alleviate this concern, in experiment 3, E1 handed the child 433 
two additional objects during the warm-up in the see(-) condition. 434 
4.1. Participants 435 
We tested a novel group of 80 twelve-month-old infants (M = 381.0 days, SD = 8.0 days, 436 
40 girls). Like in previous experiments, only infants who pointed were included in the study. 437 
For the third experiment, 15 additional infants were invited but had to be excluded because they 438 
lost interest or became uncomfortable (12), their parents interfered (2) or the experimenter made 439 
a mistake (1). 440 
4.2. Setup 441 
The setup was the same as in experiment 2 with a single change. Instead of small wooden 442 
blocks, we presented a small piece of cloth as alternative option (as in  Liszkowski et al., 2009). 443 
For the warm-up in the playroom we used a second container that was similar to the one in the 444 
test room. 445 
4.3. Procedure 446 
The general procedure was the same as in experiment 2 with the following changes: 447 
Instead of having a warm-up in the test room, E1 introduced the child to the balls and the game 448 
in the playroom. E1 repeatedly left the room to collect additional balls to demonstrate that she 449 
knew where to get more. In the see(+) condition, she left the room twice, retrieving a total of 450 
four balls, whereas she left three times (six balls) in the see(-) condition. 451 
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The two test trials were separated by a short period in the playroom during which E1 452 
introduced novel balls (different in color) and repeated the warm-up procedure. Infants received 453 
two test trials in the same condition to which they were randomly assigned. The location of the 454 
balls (left or right) was counterbalanced across children and alternated from trial 1 to trial 2. 455 
4.4. Coding and analysis 456 
For each infant we coded, whether or not she pointed to the empty plate during one of the 457 
test trials, yielding a binary code per participant analogous to experiment 2. Otherwise, coding 458 
and analysis were identical to Experiment 2. Reliability coding for experiment 3 yielded a very 459 
high agreement between coders of 94.9% (𝜅 = .87). 460 
4.5. Results 461 
The majority of infants (85.0%) pointed during one of the test trials. Thirty-seven infants 462 
pointed to the empty plate. Figure 2 shows the proportion of infants pointing to the empty plate 463 
per condition. The statistical analysis yielded very similar results as for experiment 2. Including 464 
see as a predictor improved the model fit (LRT: 𝜒2(1) = 4.11, p = .043). Infants pointed more 465 
often to the empty plate in the see(+) compared to see(-) condition (𝛽 = 0.92, p = .043; 95 % 466 
CI = [0.03: 1.84]; d = 0.45). Sex and age did not improve the model fit (LRT: 𝜒2(2) = 0.08, p 467 
= .960). 468 
4.6. Discussion 469 
Reducing the quality of the alternative option and adding a second trial succeeded in 470 
generating more points to the empty plate (see Figure 2), but it failed in augmenting the 471 
difference between the two conditions. The effect sizes found in the two experiments were very 472 
similar (d = 0.41 vs. 0.45) suggesting an overall small to medium effect. Nevertheless, 473 
experiment 3 replicates experiment 2, suggesting that the difference between conditions is 474 
reliable. Furthermore, in this experiment, children received the same number of balls from E1 475 
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in the two conditions. This rules out that receiving two additional balls from E1 in the see(+) 476 
condition in experiment 2 led infants to point more often to the empty plate in that condition. 477 
In contrast to the previous two experiments, the alternative option was undesirable to children. 478 
As outlined in the introduction, we assumed that this would cancel the difference between the 479 
two conditions. As it turns out, this assumption was not warranted. 480 
5. General discussion 481 
The three experiments reported here explored the social-cognitive basis of infants’ 482 
communication about absent entities. In experiment 1, we replicated an earlier finding showing 483 
that 12-month-old infants request specific absent entities (Bohn et al., 2015). We extended 484 
previous findings by demonstrating that infants only do so if they experienced these objects 485 
together with the person they were requesting from. In experiment 2 and 3 we provided further 486 
evidence that infants base their requests for absent entities on what the experimenter had seen 487 
during an earlier episode. Taken together, these findings suggest that infants use pointing to 488 
communicate about absent entities by making reference to an aspect of an earlier episode they 489 
experienced with their interlocutor. Earlier studies (Bohn et al., 2015; Liszkowski et al., 2009) 490 
assumed that this was case but did not demonstrate it empirically. 491 
The observed effect size appears to be reliable but small. On the one hand, this could 492 
mean that an appreciation of when to expect others to act based on what one takes to be common 493 
ground is just emerging with some infants still assuming an "omniscient adult". After all, the 494 
manipulation in experiment 2 and 3 was fairly subtle in that children were familiar with E1 and 495 
had also previously played a similar game with her. The only thing that was missing in the see(-496 
) condition was the brief shared episode preceding the test trial. Infants might differentiate 497 
between the conditions more thoroughly if the returning person was completely unfamiliar. 498 
However, this manipulation could have resulted in unwanted consequences (infants might be 499 
frightened if suddenly a completely unfamiliar person appears) and, as discussed after 500 
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experiment 1, it would make the interpretation that children track shared episodes difficult. This 501 
is why we avoided it here. On the other hand, the small effect size could be due to some aspects 502 
of our procedure. Trying to tease these two interpretations apart could be a valuable avenue for 503 
future research. Whether direct social interaction is a necessary prerequisite for infants to 504 
assume that the experimenter is familiar with the previous content of the plate is unclear based 505 
on our study alone. However, research by Moll and Tomasello (2007) suggests infants do not 506 
assume that an adult is familiar with an object if she was merely looking at it from a distance 507 
while the infant is engaged with it. 508 
Subsequent studies could also investigate the importance of timing and location. Ganea 509 
and Saylor (2007) showed that 15-month-olds used shared linguistic experience to interpret an 510 
ambiguous request only when the request was uttered immediately following the shared 511 
episode. Eighteen-month-olds were successful also after a 2.5 min delay. Saylor and Ganea 512 
(2007) reported that 17-month-olds interpreted a request for an absent object in line with a 513 
shared experience only if the requested object remained in the same location. These studies 514 
suggest that infants’ ability to produce and understand communicative signals in line with the 515 
common ground they share with their interlocutor might be mediated by more domain general 516 
cognitive processes. Nevertheless, given the right kind of scaffolding, our study suggests that 517 
infants as young as 12 month already consider common ground when actively communicating. 518 
Based on the results we can speculate about what, at least some, infants ascribed to E1 519 
based on their interaction. Experiment 1 showed that infants intended to request another 520 
preferred object (e.g. a ball) when they pointed to the empty plate. An alternative, relational 521 
interpretation could be that infants did not intended to obtain a specific object but an object that 522 
was better than the alternative. While this is certainly plausible, studies on object individuation 523 
in infancy suggest that from 12 months onward, infants represent absent objects in a fairly 524 
concrete, instead of relational, way (Van de Walle, Carey, & Prevor, 2000; Xu & Carey, 1996). 525 
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Experiment 2 and 3 further showed that infants were more likely to point to the empty plate in 526 
a situation in which the experimenter previously saw objects of the kind they intended to obtain 527 
in the location they pointed to. In contrast to earlier studies (Liebal et al., 2010; Liszkowski, 528 
Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2008), the pointed to object at test (the plate) was different from the 529 
object pointed to during the warm-up (the ball). Pointing therefore reflects an act of reference 530 
not to an object in its current state but to its state in a previously shared episode. What infants 531 
attributed to E1 based on her experience could therefore be construed as entertaining a certain 532 
psychological relation (e.g. knowing) about a specific aspect of an earlier episode. 533 
Finally, in conjunction with recent comparative work (Bohn et al., 2015; Bohn, Call, & 534 
Tomasello, 2016), the present research shows that language or other conventional 535 
communication systems are not a prerequisite for communication about absent entities. As such, 536 
it challenges theoretical accounts positing that displacement crucially depends on language. 537 
These theories assume that only a symbolic device such as a word can bridge the gap between 538 
the current perceptual experience and an absent entity or episode (Bickerton, 2009; Cuccio & 539 
Carapezza, 2015; Deacon, 1998). Our study suggests, that infants, who are not yet using 540 
language for this type of communication (Veneziano & Sinclair, 1995), recruit some form of 541 
common ground to make reference to absent entities using non-symbolic gestures. 542 
  543 
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